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The study examines the discourse of ISIS propaganda during its rise and dispersion
periods, to conclude its ability to convince, when it is devoid of power, compared
with its speech that was at the rising of the organization. The study’s methodology
based mainly on Teun A. van Dijk’s and Norman Fairclough’s approaches to Critical
Discourse Analysis. The researcher selected two long-films to be analyzed: Flames
of War I (Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun) & Flames of War II (Flames of War
until the Final Hour). The study found that there are differences in ISIS’ discourse
during the periods of the rise to the collapse. Whereas its first film carried messages
to America and the global coalition in the initiative of psychological warfare, the
second one carried messages to its supporters and fighters to be patient and keep
away from discouragement after the defeat. The study also concluded that the best
way to combat the Islamic State group is through stripping it of the technological
power and expertness alike, as the battle now becomes a battle of ideologies and
not a battle of weapons.
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It is unlikely in this time to find someone who has never heard of the “Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant,” also known as “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” or Daesh.1 The terrorist
organization that captured the attention of the international world through its barbaric
actions, followed by its state declaration in 2014 (Oosterveld & Bloem, 2017). Since its
rise in the summer of 2014, its media machine has held the world’s attention. As the ISIS’
media has not only amplified the image of the group and its power but also accompanied
with propaganda functions, which were manifested by the simple use of new media
technology; to reinforce the military and organizational capabilities (Masri, 2016). Simone
Molin Friis (2015) mentioned in his study that “the technological innovations of the digital
age have influenced not just how war can be shown, but also who can successfully produce,
choose and disseminate images of war to a larger audience” (Friis, 2015, p. 728). That is
what the Islamic State understood very well and tried to exploit for its benefit. The skillfully
use of media technologies which terrorist organizations have never recruited intelligently




Simone Friis (2015) mentioned that in the age of media technologies and increased
visual communication across borders, the horror of war had been transformed and
accelerated through visual images. The Islamic State employed visual communication
better than we expected. Whereby, the real and the effective weapon used by the Islamic
State are the high-quality videos, filmed precisely and professionally in the way mimic the
Hollywood style. For instance, the films Flames of War I & II, which distinctly technical
visual releases, emphasize the presence of expertise and competencies behind those high-
tech productions, who specialized in the field of technology and political propaganda.
This accurate understanding of the nature of the visual images has made the
discourse of the Islamic State influential on the audience, especially in its peak periods.
ISIS, through its media, captures the imagination of a large number of young Muslims
around the world. Its apparent success has also led to many conversions to Islam among
marginalized young non-Muslims in Western countries, who are attracted by their violent
acts and their attractive slogans (Schmid, 2015). We can say that ISIS’ media machine has
developed a range of uncommonly sophisticated and exceptional communication initiatives
that are exceptionally accessible and attractive to its audience (Veilleux-Lepage, 2016).
Nevertheless, after the military intervention against it, there have been many
indicators of the changes in ISIS’ media discourse in general, coinciding with many changes
that took place during this period. We can find that the propaganda activities of ISIS,
especially videos releases, have been declined or perhaps slowed down in the recent
period, which may reflect the losses suffered by the organization in its main strongholds in
Iraq and Syria. As well as, the electronic campaign and the global efforts against ISIS’
propaganda may affect its activity. According to a study by terrorism researchers at West
Point, in August 2015, at the height of the media production of the Islamic State, the group
issued more than 700 items from official outlets in its states. In August 2016, after a year
of airstrikes and other attacks, the figure had declined to fewer than 200 items (Shane,
2016). During the same period, the proportion of military reporting material doubled to 70
percent, breaking the attention to governance, trade and other topics that depicted civilian
life (Shane, 2016).
However, despite these facts, ISIS showed flexibility and adaptation in passing its
media discourse and spreading its message even at the height of its collapse. That is
proven by the recent video release of ISIS entitled Flames of War until the Final Hour, the
second part of the video Flames of War I, broadcasted three years ago. Flames of War II
emphasized the power and cohesion of the ISIS’ media machine despite the actual loss on
the battlefield. That leads us to study the ISIS’ propaganda during the period of rising and
dispersion, which requires in-depth analysis to compare between its foundational and
new discourse, to conclude its ability to convince, when it is devoid of power, compared
with its discourse that was at the rising of the organization.
The ISIS’ Visual Discourse at the Height of Its Power
We can assert that the peak of ISIS’ media activities was between 2014 and 2015 when it
broke away from Al-Qaeda. Followed by an improvement in its military and financial
status, until it reached its peak with the invasion of Mosul and the declaration of the
caliphate in 2014 (ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State, 2018).
Since that time Islamic State has amazed the whole world with its highly sophisticated
and, at times, shocking media operations (Veilleux-Lepage, 2016). ISIS established a powerful
Central Media Department that was of high quality, effective and centralized (ISIS’s Media
Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State, 2018). Through it, ISIS’s media strategy
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went from local to global discourse to reach target audiences around the world, as ISIS is
producing its propaganda in many languages like English, Arabic, Russian, Urdu, Turkish,
and even Hebrew (Williams, 2016). Moreover, to assert its authority and to promote fear,
both among Muslims and non-Muslims, ISIS has published a dramatic spectacle in the
videos of beheadings, torture and mass murders (Perry & Long, 2016).
It can be stated, that the power of ISIS is primarily in using high technology to
deliver its discourse, as in the age of the picture; IS uses images to amplify its force and to
send the message shockingly. Friis (2017) inferred that the technical skills of an Islamic
State are not only reflected in the way in which it disseminates its material but also in how
to organize its visual discourse impressively. Nevertheless, the power strategy of the ISIS
does not limit; it focuses on the social network, audio broadcasts and electronic games
which shocking the mind, logic, and inhumanity, carries through them many messages and
objectives.
Over time, ISIS produced a large number of very high-quality videos that mimic
Hollywood-style with exciting novels to capture the viewer’s attention (Williams, 2016).
Thereby, Al-Qaeda’s tedious long videos have been replaced by ISIS’ high definition
steady-cam shots, along with carefully scripted and edited narration, besides multilingual
messaging, all aimed to attract young Muslims in east and west, and encouraging them to
emigrate to the newly founded caliphate (Veilleux-Lepage, 2016). Therefore, its persuasive
discourse produces by professional journalists, film-makers, photographers, and editors.
Moreover, it has brought in cutting-edge technology and qualified operators (Vigil, 2016).
That has resulted in its film outputs like Flames of War, clashing of swords, healing of the
believer’s chest.
According to an analysis of several high-quality videos that target different
audiences, Veilleux-Lepage (2016) found that the ISIS’ discourse aimed to intimidate others
and display its power that contributes to proving its presence and continuity. Terrorism
experts realized that the Islamic State group succeeded in doing that, through the beheading
videos. Friis (2015) sees in his study that during the autumn of 2014, the ISIS’ beheading
videos played an important role in media and public debates, as well as in official political
dialogue concerning the war against ISIS (Friis, 2015). Following Zarqawi’s footsteps, who
was the first who led the visual warfare with a joint effort of the theatre and the spectacle,
the Islamic State led a series beheading and killing videos with cold-blooded murder
displaying inhumanity, which undoubtedly shocked the entire world (Vigil, 2016). The
intense attention devoted to beheading videos proves the apparent weight of visual images
and media in contemporary war (Friis, 2015). Scenes of the execution of the hostages are
a form of accomplishment of this task, as these videos have caused widespread popular
acclaim all over the world. The creativity of the shots lies in skillfully playing on the
emotions of the viewer and raising the degree of tension.
Hence, by the above, it can be concluded that the whole ISIS’ media discourse at its
highest aimed at establishing a permanent caliphate; fomenting divisions; weakening the
enemy and recruiting. The Islamic State entered into the year 2015 at the height of its fame,
because of the military and media successes achieved before, which was able to bring
about 5000 immigrants to its ranks until that date. That led to establishing the global air
coalition; to prevent it from moving towards the city of Erbil, and expel it from Ayn al-Arab
“Kobanî.”  By the end of the first month of 2015, be practically the first severe military and
media setback faced after the declaration of its state.
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The ISIS’ Discourse at Its Caliphate Collapse
Much has been written about the discourse of the ISIS’ media and its capabilities as we
mentioned above, but after the breakdown, its media ability is witnessing a decline and
deconstruction, which calls for a profound analysis of the discourse influence on
persuasion when it is devoid of power.
The propaganda of the Islamic State, which has helped to attract thousands of
foreign fighters to Syria and Iraq, has declined dramatically; as the extremist group has
subjected to military pressure that has mainly caused the decline (Shane, 2016). Many
studies see ISIS’ discourse at its height attracted hundreds or even thousands of young
Muslim people and convinced them to join its ranks (Gates & Podder, 2015; Siboni, Cohen
D, & Koren, 2015; Golan, & Lim, 2016; Awan, 2017). But the territorial losses suffered by the
group after that, including the fall of the group’s stronghold in Iraq (Mosul) and Syria
(Al-Raqqa), seem to have a direct impact on the ISIS’ media production and its propaganda
discourse. By the end of the first month of 2015, to be practically the first severe military
and media setback faced after the declaration of its state.
The production of official and advocacy offices has declined steadily since the
end of 2015, particularly in areas related to the primary focal points of ISIS in Iraq and
Syria (Winter & Parker, 2018). According to a report published in the Ayn Al-Madina
magazine, the number of monthly leaflets issued by ISIS related to Syria did not exceed the
barrier of 900 in January 2016. Also, the video footage witnessed a decrease of fewer than
140 releases from Syria and just over 400 releases from all the states in February 2016.
That is, the group lost more than 45% of its media production related to Syria, which
amounted to approximately 285 videos in June 2015.
The decline of the quality and quantity ISIS’ discourse appears in: “shorter reports;
defensive tones; late reporting and late claims of responsibility; inaccuracies and
exaggerations; problems with the translation of titles and headlines from Arabic to English.”
(ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State, 2018, p. 1). Some
researchers attributed this decline to ISIS’ media operatives who have been killed or
seriously injured in airstrikes such as Junaid Hussain, Mohammed Emwazi, Abousamra,
and Denis (Zelin, Rena, & David, 2015). Other attributed the decline in quality to the loss of
Al-Raqqa, as the content had changed dramatically when the media network’s main centers
were fallen (Warrick, 2018).
Cori E. Dauber, a visual communication specialist, noted that the releases of ISIS
did between 2016-2017 not only decrease in quantity but also quality as the Islamic State
suffered blow after blow. The video footage of the ISIS was significantly reduced, except the
provinces of the state of Raqqa, where releases from Al-Hayat Media Center continue to be
high quality, but are less frequent (Zelin, Rena, & David, 2015).
Besides, after the loss of land, ISIS’ propaganda discourse has focused on the
impact of the coalition aircraft bombing. For instance, the percentage of video clips that
showed the effects, and victims of the raids are more than 20% of the total visual reports
published by the ISIS until the end of February of 2017 (Masri, 2016). This type of discourse
came in the context of appeal and grievances after it was more clearly an exhortatory
context (Masri, 2016). Winter and Parker (2018) assert in their report that the Islamic
State has shifted in the strategic direction which formed in advance; by changing the focus
on migration to the land of the caliphate. The Islamic State no longer gives priority to this
type of recruitment. Instead, it has been replaced by a new short-term goal of
“retributive terrorism” (Winter & Parker, 2018).
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It also has been noted the decline in the engaging content of the visual releases
disseminated by the ISIS. It is possible to observe a drop of the technical effects and the
dramatic output of the story, which was a reason to draw attention to the group as an
immense media phenomenon. Whereas, the war reports, depicting the clashes between
terrorists and the hostile forces from Iraq and Syria, had acquired more than 35% of the
film material broadcast by the ISIS on its websites. At the same time, the private and
professional releases have fallen to less than 8% according to a study published by Ayn Al-
Madina magazine (2016). Moreover, the West Point study found an increase in material
showing the execution of Islamic State fighters accused of spying or treason. On the other
hand, the study found a decrease in the filming of executions of captured enemy combatants.
The researchers believe the shift points to more worry inside the Islamic State about
infiltrators and the desire to deter those who tend to betray the caliphate (Shane, 2016).
Some also believe that the output of the Islamic State has also slowed down due to
the efforts of social media companies to thwart the Islamic State’s use. Consequently, the
considerable interest in avoiding actions against it has slowed its production
(Shane, 2016). As a result, ISIS and its supporters turn to use Telegram application, which
enables the group’s members to communicate anonymously. That provides a solution to
connect with activists and advocates worldwide but at the price of the difficulty of spreading
the propaganda to a broader audience and spreading its messages through public debates
on social networks (ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State,
2018).
However, as Warrick (2018) inferred, the terrorist group is now showing signs of
the media reorganization. Although the group suffered a significant decline in production
from coalition attacks and regime attacks, it is now taking new steps to reshape the
propaganda process (Warrick, 2018). According to Parker and Winter (2018), the analysts
of the Islamic State’s propaganda, the group’s propaganda production has changed in the
post-Caliphate era; as the group lost territory, yet its online presence evolved. According to
an analysis released by the SITE Intelligence Group, which specializes in jihadist content,
the first weeks of 2018 saw a sharp rise in traffic on Islamist social media accounts
compared to previous months (Warrick, 2018). IS also reconstructed most of its websites
and propaganda agencies and started to produce better quality products. Even though the
quality of ISIS’s current media have not yet returned to the previous situation, its recovery
is noticeable both in its central media outlets and in the local media materials. That can be
noted through its releases published by its provinces in Syria, Iraq, Sinai, and Khorasan
(ISIS’s Media Network in the Era after the Fall of the Islamic State, 2018).
Methodology
The study’s method based mainly on Teun A. van Dijk’s and Norman Fairclough’s approaches
to Critical Discourse Analysis. CDA was usually used marginally as a part of critical
studies in social science. (Van Dijk, 1995). But most recently, CDA has become an established
academic discipline as all other academic disciplines (Wodak, 2007).
According to Teun A. van Dijk, CDA studies “the relations between discourse, power,
dominance, social inequality and the position of the discourse analyst in such social
relationships” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). In the same context, Jaffer Sheyholislami sees that
the critical discourse analysis “is primarily text-based (syntax, lexicon, local semantics,
topics, schematic structures, etc.)” (Sheyholislami, 2001, p. 4).
Mainly, CDA examines the discourse (the language) as a form of social practice;
this social practice reveals controversial relationships between a particular discursive
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case and the situations, institutions and social structures that frame it (Wodak, 2007).
According to Wodak (2007), CDA characterizes by shared interests in clarifying ideologies
and power through the systematic discussion of semiotic data, which may be written,
spoken or visual (Wodak, 2007).
Van Diik (1995) clarified that CDA aims to study all levels and dimensions of
discourse, namely, “those of grammar, style, rhetoric, schematic, organization, speech
acts, and pragmatic strategies” (Van Diik, 1995, p. 18). However, discourse studies do not
limit to verbal discourse, but also studies other semiotic dimensions (pictures, films,
sound, music, gestures, etc.) (Van Diik, 1995).
Fairclough (1995b) determined a three-part model in analyzing any communicative
interaction as Jaffer Sheyholislami (2001) mentioned in his study: the text, discourse
practice, and sociocultural practice. The first analytical level according to Fairclough’s is
a text analysis (vocabulary, grammar, semantics, the sound system, etc.) (Fairclough, 1995b,
cited in Jaffer Sheyholislami, 2001). The second level is discourse practice which straddles
the division between society and culture on the one hand, and discourse, language, and
text on the other one (Fairclough, 1995, cited in Jaffer Sheyholislami, 2001). Sociocultural
practice is the third analytical level. According to Fairclough, this stage builds on three
aspects: “economic (i.e., economy of the media), political (i.e., power and ideology of the
media), and cultural (i.e., issues of values)” (Fairclough, 1995b, p. 62, cited in Jaffer
Sheyholislami, 2001, p. 9).
The critical CDA gives us an essential approach in exploring the verbal and visual
interactions in the ISIS’ discourse and its hidden meanings. Besides, CDA will help to
examine the link between discourse and ideologies in the ISIS’ highest and collapse periods.
Materials
To analyze ISIS’ changes in its discourse, I will focus mainly on the ISIS’ video releases,
through analyzing textual and visual discursive of those releases. I selected two long-
films: Flames of War I (Flames of War: The Fighting Has Just Begun) and Flames of War II
(Flames of War until the Final Hour). They were chosen to analyze for many reasons. First,
the two films were produced in two different periods, almost three years. The first release
was at the height of the military and media power of ISIS, while the second one produced at
the climax of its decline and loss. So, by analyzing these two films, we can conclude the
changes in the ISIS’ persuasive discourse from the beginning of the rise of the caliphate to
the period of decline and the collapse of the state.
Additionally, these two films, published by Al-Hayat Media Center, have made a
wide-ranging echo, especially in the Western countries targeted by these releases as well
as in the Arab and Islamic countries. These films have found fertile ground in the minds of
the Arab public and the modern West alike. According to his study, Veilleux-Lepage (2016)
reached that “after two days of the film Flames of War having been uploaded, one randomly
selected page had alone recorded 18,034 views within just a seven-hour timeframe” (Veilleux-
Lepage, 2016, p. 43). Thus, the films confirmed the ease and speed of ISIS’ discourse to be
spread, and therefore the important to analyze these two films to derive the strategy ISIS is
adopting to promote its discourses.
As well, the films have high production qualities. They have implemented following
the specifications of Hollywood action films, even after the collapse of ISIS. That is
confirmed by the film Flames of War II, which constitutes the image of ISIS in the human
mind as a tremendous force which cannot vanish.
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Besides, these films summarize the discourse of ISIS and, focus on fundamental
elements of its ideology, like empathizing on permanent caliphate; fomenting divisions;
weakening the enemy and recruiting, etc. These characteristics make it interesting for
critical discourse analysis.
Analysis
To analysis ISIS discourse in its two films, we studied the overall meaning first. Then, we
focused on the most pre-eminent codes covering the ISIS’ discourse on those films. We
divided it into three main aspects: Political; religious; psychological codes. We provided
the correlation of those codes with the context, text, audio-visual clips, voiceover, dialogues
that employed in the two films. Then we divided those codes to mechanisms used in ISIS
discourse as followed:
Political Codes
This code means the political techniques used by ISIS in the context of impact on the enemy
and the audience behaviors, through discussing the tone of the challenge, cleavage and
desertion, the betrayal, and the defeat mechanisms to draw the points of agreement and
disagreement in the discourse of the ISIS during the ups and downs of its State.
Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun (Flames of War I)
Power Amplification
In its propaganda discourse, as the ISIS seeks to reduce the enemy’s power and make it
down at the same time, it exaggerates the reality; to portray itself as a force that does not
prevail. Therefore, it justifies the viewer that the decision to establish a global coalition to
fight it is; because of its strength, and the inability to confront it by one military. That puts
the viewer in awe of the strength and power of this group and gives a direct indication to
the public that the Islamic State is a significant force, and need armies to fight it.
For instance, in the minute marked 02.44, in footage showing the ISIS’ fighters
targeting US-style armors, and destroying them. Then showing attacks on various areas of
Iraq, the commentator comes to say: “Obama was forced to respond to the rapid rise of
ISIS.” The ISIS comment is a declarative statement by which it informs about the power of
ISIS. Hence, the verb “was forced” is semantic of the USA surprise about ISIS power, and
“rapid rise” connotes to the of Islamic State capabilities and power. Thus, ISIS is presenting




The Tone of the Challenge
The film began with the challenge and direct call to confront America and other Crusader
alliance (as it describes them), where the propaganda makers first began their attitude
towards everyone who stood against it in its battle. The film conveys the most crucial
message directed to its audience and opponents when the documentary included the Former
US President George W. Bush spoke at a conference saying “either you are with us, or with
the terrorists.” Thus, Bush sent a clear message to his enemies; there are only two options.
ISIS cleverly used this speech by using the words of its enemies to challenge its enemies. As
the employment of the sentence is a verbal sign to two teams in this war. Thus, the debate
was topicalized about the concept of “You are either with the Islamic State, or against it,
and therefore you are our adversary.”
Another example appeared at 03.11 when Abu Muhammad al-Adnani’s speech
used while the film was depicting the tanks of the Islamic State invading some parts of
Iraq, in response to a statement by former US President Obama, who said that his troops
would not resume fighting in Iraq. He stated: “the frightening has just begun, and insha’Allah
we will be victorious… if you are unable to return, then we will come from every corner of
the earth to fight you”.
We see that Adnani’s statement is metaphorically hyperbolic, where it emerges
from the context of the rhetoric structure the challenge of America and its allies. The
speech was topicalized about the concept of confrontation, and the inevitable victory of
God for those true Believers (ISIS fighters). Where the rhetoric went too far of exaggeration
when it challenges the dominant force in the world to come to its home, “we will come to
from every corner of the earth” is a symbolic sign of challenging America and its allies in
its homeland (by carrying out terrorist operations). Therefore, the message carries out the
meaning that, ISIS will not only fight them in the territory of the conflict, but it will be
everywhere.
Flames of War until the Final Hour (Flames of War II)
Recognition of Defeat
The discourse of the Islamic State in the film “The Flame of War II” (which came after the
loss of most of the areas of influence in Iraq and Syria) confirmed that it had lost round in
the war with the Al’ahzab (The global coalition and other countries that are fighting ISIS).
The filmmakers urged its fighters in many of its shots to be patient, emphasize that the
victory comes after the intensification of adversities. Whereas, the film contained a lot of
words confirmed that this period experienced the Islamic State is only a period to scrutinize
the true believers, as mentioned in the minute 5:29 from Al-Tawbaa Surah: 139: “So do not
weaken and do not grieve, and you are superior if you are true believers.” It is an imperative
sentence urges the believers (ISIS fighters) to be patient and enduring as mentioned “do not
weaken” “do not grieve” which is (calling for patience) and the reward will be “you are
superior, victorious, and the owners of the paradise.” From those phrases, we understand
the significant sign of the retreat and defeat.  Another example could find at the minute
03.53 when Shaykh Abul-Hasan Al-Muhajir (one of ISIS leaders) said, addressing America
and its allies, “we will never be overcome, for war alternates, the days are taken in turns.”
This declarative statement declares implicitly that the Islamic State is in a phase of loss,
decline, and regression. Whereas, “war alternates” and “days are taken in turns” are connotes
of the retreat.
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At the end of the film, we could find another example, as in the last minutes, the
Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi said: “O Muslims, Don’t be amazed at the nations of Kufr, and
the state and paths of Kufr all rallying together against the Islamic State. For this is the
condition of the victorious group in every era”.  By which the first statement was imperative
“Don’t be amazed at the nations of Kufr,” calls on Muslims not to be surprised by the victory
of the enemies of Islam (infidels), it is just a path in a long war. The second statement
comes in the form of a comment “For this is the condition of the victorious group in every
era” which is obvious connotes of the defeat and loss.
Cleavage and Desertion
The Islamic State implicitly admitted in this film that there were cleavage and desertion
blew away the organization as a result of successive defeats in Iraq and Syria. Where, the
period before the release of the film witnessed the execution of some of its fleeing and
dissident leaders, claiming that they are the reason for the loss and decline of the Islamic
state in that time. It considered that as a stage of purification of rows, which precedes
victory. Where the commentator said at the minute 05.11: “The jihad enters a new phase,
purification for believers, destruction for disbelievers.”
The comment is a declarative statement by which it was informing about cleavage
in ISIS rows. As the sentence was implicitly aimed to declare a split and betrayal, Hence,
the “believers” is a metaphor of “ISIS True fighters,” “disbelievers” another metaphor
referring to the dissident and traitor ISIS members. Therefore, it`s clear the selectivity of its
word “new phase” “purification” “destruction” as a connoted signification to the cleavage
and desertion blew away the ranks of the Islamic State in the period of losing the control
of vast territories of Iraq and Syria.
The Betrayal
The focus on the betrayal is a common aspect of the two films. Therefore, the discourse of
the ISIS also focused on both films (Flames of War I & II) on the treachery and betrayal of
the military leaders to the soldiers. At the end of both films, the filmmakers focus on the
escape of the senior leaders of Syrian and Iraq regimes, leaving their soldiers without
leadership to face the fate of death by the ISIS. That what appeared in the first film in the
minute 52.40 when a Syrian captive was talking while digging his grave with his hand, his
voice appeared smothered, and the heartbreak is visible on his face, he said: “To the
regime’s army we are just numbers. To the regime’s army, we are just dogs”.  That scene
reappeared in the second version, at the minute marked 55.36, when the Syrian captive
digging his grave spoke to one anonymous ISIS member “ I served for 12 years in the Syrian
army, and in the end, they didn’t even offer a slipper in exchange for me.”
The two dialogues were topicalized about betrayal and desertion of the Arabic
(Syrian and Iraqi) regimes leaders. The visual depiction and the text are vivid evidence of
betrayal and abandonment. As “numbers” and “dogs” “didn’t offer a slipper in exchange for
me” are a symbolic sign used to confirm that those who are in the row of infidels will
confront the fate of abandonment, in the context of convincing the spectator that whoever
is against the Islamic state, its fate is humiliation and shame. You worth nothing to the
infidels, you are just an insignificant number, a passing dog, no one cares about his life or
death. Therefore, the filmmakers ended both films with this scene to put the viewer in front
of a mental and emotional trial, which makes him see that the fate of those who oppose the




This code means the beneficial employment of the Islamic religion, through the exploitation
of Quranic verses, Prophetic traditions and the opinions of Islamic jurists; for purely
authoritarian purposes, aimed at persuasion, cooperation, and allegiance. We find this in
The flames of war I & II through the use of religious discourse and historical symbols to
influence the public, such as talk about the revival of the Islamic Caliphate, the sacred
divine support for Mujahideen (fighters of ISIS), in addition to raising morale.
Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun (Flames of War I)
The Revival of the Caliphate
From the first seconds of the film, ISIS discourse was stressing that it came to revive the
Caliphate. That was noticeable in the film “flames of war I” at the second 00.28 when the
commenter of the film said: “A mission that would presage the return to the Caliphate and
revival the concrete of Tawhid …to unite the Ummah on one call, one banner, one land.” This
sentence is predicative sentence propped by visual proof of the jihadists to move to the
land of the Caliphate for a pledge of allegiance. As the “mission” here is a metaphor of the
revival of the Caliphate, the lofty goal that Muslims have lost for years. Also, the “unite the
Ummah” is semantic of the Caliphate which Muslims (Ummah) must support and obey.
In addition to playing with the religious terms, the Islamic state always supports
its speech with sacred evidence from the holy book or the Prophet’s Hadiths (tradition). We
touch that in the minute 06.21 of the film, with the visual depiction of foreign Mujahideen
from different countries came to Syria to pledge of allegiance of the Caliph, and migrate to
the land of the Caliphate. Whereas the commentator said “from all corner of the world,
they answered the call of Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), “go to Al-Sham,” they
pledged of allegiance Amir Almuminin ‘Abu Bakr Albaghdadi.” The audio-visual as a text is
a vivid representation of the realism of Caliphate; the message of ISIS discourse was
topicalized about the concept of true Caliphate that proven by a sacred proof of Prophet
Muhammad Hadith “go to Al-Sham1” which is a sign to immigrate to the land of the Caliphate
(Sham) by the Messenger of Islam. Thus, this sentence connotes that, the establishing of
Caliphate is only evaluates the law of Allah and His Messenger in the earth.
Divine Support
The filmmakers rhetorically employ divine support to provide a push and persuasion of the
ISIS fighters. In the movie “the Flames of War I” The filmmakers rhetorically employ divine
support to provide a push and persuasion that they are the victorious sect supported by
divine promise. For instance, the narrator quoted Hadith (Prophet Muhammad tradition), at
the minute mark 04.43 in Arabic with English translation, from one of the Prophet Mohammed’s
companions called  Salamah bin Nufal said: “Allah will provide the fighters of my Ummah
from the deviated ones until the hour comes and the promise of Allah is fulfilled”. Employing
such Hadith has much semantics. Where, the use of the Hadith here seems to be evidence of
the divine support of the fighters of “my Ummah” which is the metaphor of (ISIS jihadists, the
true Believers), against their enemies whatever they are, as the deviated ones that is a metaphor
of (apostates – infidels- polytheist) and other enemies of ISIS. Besides, the phrase “the
promise of Allah is fulfilled” it is indicative of divine support and inevitable triumph from
Allah to the ISIS fighter (the true Ummah, the true Believers).
288
Journal of Communication: Media Watch 10 (2)
Flames of War until the Final Hour (Flames of War II)
Divine Support
The employment of religious texts that emphases divine support is apparent in the minute
mark 33.03, when a jihadist provoking Mujahideen in a provocative “O protectors of Islam
and guardians of the creed, know that you will be victorious, with Allah’s permission, and
that victory is from Allah. Listen to the statement of Allah (may He be glorified) “how many a
small company has overcome a large company by permission of Allah” (Al-Baqarah: 249).
The syntax of these statements indicates apparent rhetorical hybridity to stimulate
persuasion. By which the first phrase “O protectors of Islam and guardians of the creed” is
vocative case imposing attention from the protectors of Islam and guardians of the creed,
which is a metaphor of (ISIS fighters). The second phrase comes in the form of a comment,
thus “victorious” a metaphor of the jihadists with divine support given only to those who
champion the doctrine of God on the earth. The second part of the hybridized statement
(the quoted phrase of Al-Baqarah Sura) comes in a context that complete the thematic
structure of the whole statement in the verbal rhetoric impact. Whereas, the verse came as
a confirmation of the divine support given to those who fight in the cause of Allah, is a
supporter of the victory of God, even if the confrontation between a small company which
is metaphor of (ISIS fighters) and a large company which is a metaphor of (the enemies of
the Islamic state, infidels).
Elevating Morale
The second film focused on this aspect through give evidence and proofs from religious
sources and Quranic verses that confirm its speech about the victory after the defeats; to
raise morale among its fighters, at a time when the organization is subjected failures from
several fronts. For example, at the minute 36.08 until 38.5 the battles fought by the Islamic
state in the Sinai were filmed, accompanied by a soundtrack that instilled enthusiasm in
the hearts of the fighters. The fighters were depicted as they stormed and controlled
courageously. Alongside the visual depiction, comes the commenter‘s speech about verse
173 of Al-Saffat Surah “And [that] indeed, our soldiers will be those who overcome.” The
filmmakers in their portrayal of these battles relied on the assertion that the ISIS fighters
are the “victorious sect” in the end. Hence, the phrase cited by the propaganda “And [that]
indeed” is an affirmative phrase sure the final result to soldiers of Allah is the victory. In
this context “our soldiers” is a metaphor of the “ISIS jihadists” who support the Allah
cause. Therefore, the result of that support is that ISIS jihadists who would “overcome,”
which is a significance to the superiority of ISIS jihadists in the end. Thus, the victor of the
ISIS jihadists is topicalized in that verse about Allah’s division to his soldiers. Hence, the
message here that the soldiers of Allah (Mujahideen) are inevitably bound by Allah victory;
to raise the morale of his soldiers and encourage them to continue fighting, despite the
loss suffered in both Iraq and Syria.
Psychological Codes
This code means the psychological techniques used by ISIS in the context of impact on the
enemy and the audience behaviors. Through showing the courage and the bravery of the
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fighters; exaggerating the military and physical strength of its soldiers; depicting the
excessive brutality of ISIS, showing enemy’s inhumanity, and enemies’ cowardice in the
face of the power and the might of the Islamic State.
Flames of War: Fighting Has Just Begun (Flames of War I)
ISIS’ Fighters “Prowess”
One of the essential messages carried by the film Flame of War I is to show the courage and
the bravery of the fighters. The filmmakers excelled in depicting the ISIS fighters beating
infidels without fear. They also focused on portraying the ISIS fighters as they attack,
invade, and extort from the enemy. They depict the calmness, serenity, poise and fearlessness
of the fighters. For example, at minute 43.37, the film depicts a jihadist with a close shot,
speaking about the enthusiasm and morale of its soldiers to break into the remaining
places to take over the entire headquarters of the 17th division base in Al-Raqqa: “They’re
active and full of energy. They haven’t slept for two days, but they’re ready to carry out an
assault at any moment”. From this active sentence, we can deduce that the quoted talk of
the ISIS jihadi was topicalized about the “bravery” and “might” of ISIS. As the activity and
energy of its members even they haven’t slept connotes the prowess and manhood of its
fighters.
Enemies’ Cowardice
One of the things observed in the discourse of the Islamic State that film is the portrayal of
the enemy’s cowardice, weakness, and its collapse in the face of the power and the might of
the Islamic state. As a result of the courage of the ISIS soldiers and their boldness in the
fighting, we find the escape of enemies’ fighters from the battlefield. Even though the enemy
has armies, weapons and equipment, they are cowards and defeated in front of ISIS lion-
hearted soldiers. For example, at the minute 28.50, a wide shot shows the escape of PPK
fighters from their strongholds. Alongside the visual depiction, comes the commenter’s
speech describing the escape of secularists (PPK fighters), and the abandonment of their
headquarters. The secularists tasted the torment of Allah, the flames were scorching them,
forced them to run like cowards. (And if those who disbelievers fight against you, they
indeed would have their backs, then they would found neither a Wali (protector) nor a
helper. (Al-Fath Surah, 48:22).
The syntax of these statements indicates rhetorical hybridity to ensure persuasive
effects on the viewers by providing them with visual and textual facts.  By which the first
phrase “The secularists tasted the torment of Allah” is declarative statement declares the
miserable situation ended by the enemy’s secularists. Hence, the “secularists” is a metaphor
of (PPK fighters), while the “flames” is a metaphor of (ISIS fighters). Also, “scorching them”
connotes to ISIS’ victory while PPK fighters fled like chicken-hearted.
The second part of the hybridized statement (the quoted phrase of Al-Fath Surah)
came to emphasize that the end of all (disbelievers) who fight the true believers (the
Islamic State) is flight and horror, as the affirmative phrase confirms the result of the act,
they surely (have their backs) in a metaphor of flee and escape.
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The Deficiency
The discourse of the Islamic State from the beginning to the end of that film, and even in a
general ISIS propaganda, relying on exaggerating the military and physical strength of its
fighters. Besides, it is reducing and diminishing the enemy’s power whatever its weight, in
the context of psychological warfare. For example, at 2.30 minute, the film depicts the
Islamic State’s fighters thwarting all types of shelling on the enemy in an apparent reference
to the inability of the major powers to end this organization, which reduces the strength of
the enemy and make him confused. That confirmed by the narrator saying “the flames in
Iraq growing stronger, leaving the American pondering, wondering what the strategy to
fight the Islamic State?” The narrator’s speech included declarative and interrogative
statements provide an opportunity for the viewer to think about the powerlessness of the
superpower country to fight it.  The statements were topicalized about a “pondering” and
“wondering” which connote confusion and helplessness, within the context of the enemies’
inability and withdrawal.
Flames of War until the Final Hour (Flames of War II)
Enemies’ Pusillanimity
The Islamic State’s second release continued to show the fear of its enemies (infidels) and
their fleeing from their strongholds due to the bravery and courage of the Islamic State
fighters. For instance, at the minute 16.59 a wide shot depicting the escape of the Al-Assad
Army in the battles of Palmyra. Alongside the visual depiction, comes one jihadist‘s comment
“they turned back, those pigs, those apostates” The phrase “turned back” connotes to
fleeing and escaping, as the “pigs” “apostates” are metaphors to Al-Assad regime fighters,
within the context of the enemies’ inability and withdrawal.
However, in this release, this mechanism appeared less than the previous film,
perhaps due to the loss suffered by the Islamic State in that period, unlike the first film,
which was issued at the height of the Islamic State and its spread at the vast area of Iraq
and Syria.
Enemy’s Inhumanity
In this film, the propaganda of the Islamic State was adopted to show the global alliance
led by America in the context of lying and hypocrisy, through presenting the images of the
innocent victims who were died by the bombing of the coalition. The film at the minute
02.01 depicts clips and pictures of died children of Al-Raqqa who killed as a result of
coalition’ attacks. Simultaneously, it portrays President Donald Trump, talking about the
brutality of ISIS “This is an evil, sadistic, monstrous enemy, absolute butchers”. Thus, it is
evidence that the tones of this film differ from the first release. The new one focused on
emotion, showing video clips documenting the deaths of civilians as a result of the raids
by the global coalition aircraft, and exploiting it to legitimize attacks that targeted Western
countries.
ISIS filmmakers applied Trump declaration in the form of monologue to give the
audience evidence of the contradiction of statements with the reality. Thus, propaganda
makers of ISIS are presenting evidence that those who accuse the ISIS of brutality and
inhumanity are more violent and sadistic. As when the clips of innocent civilians
291
Ibrahim & Shi
accompanied by the description of the ISIS as “sadistic” “monstrous” ”evil” “butchers” put
the viewer in a case of contradiction and suspicion, and this is what the ISIS deliberately
target in this release.
Excessive Brutality
Although the ISIS used brutality to portray scenes of execution and slaughter of prisoners,
it excelled in showing its brutality in that film in the context of the psychological impact on
the enemy and on the audience. ISIS’ visual discourse in the second film focuses on the
feelings of superiority and panic through visual images, which express the power and
brutality that cannot be deterred and reveals the absolute cruelty toward its enemies. The
slow-motion scenes employed cleverly, especially in the beheading scenes, execution, and
slaughter violently with knives, destruction of heads with stones, in addition to the burning,
all to show its atrocious brutality. For example, from the minute 45:00 till minute 49:00,
the film shoot brutal beheadings against the captives, where ISIS’ terrorists held captives’
necks, on the side of the screen, and pulls their knife form wooden box without even
looking at the camera. They slaughter the captives and throw their heads into a hole full of
blood. This scene and many other scenes of that film summarize the bloody, inhumanity
and provocative discourse of ISIS propaganda, which it deliberately wants to deliver to the
enemies and the audience, as a clear message this time that it is still capable of terrorizing
and cause awe to its enemies.
Conclusion
After the analysis of the films, we can notice that the Flames of War II discourse is
significantly different from the Flames of War I. The first release contained a tone of
challenge and elation, as the ISIS in this release started through its discourse a psychological
war against their enemy after the declaration of the global coalition to fight it. In contrast,
the second one conceded defeat and carried messages to its supporters and fighters to be
patient and keep away from discouragement after the collapse.
The Flames of War II was not at the level of the Flame of War I which released
three years ago, but it establishes the group’s approach to the next stage. Where, we can
conclude from the messages the film carried, that the ISIS in the next level will adopt the
guerrilla war in territories which still under control. As well as, it would engage in terrorist
operations, and start the stage of “sleeper cells” war.
We can say that there is also a common discourse between the two releases. The
ISIS through them wanted to deliver a message that their movement is universal. It is
adopting English as the primary language of the films, choosing a fighter who spoke in a
correct English dialect, as well as showing many Western fighters; all to deliver a message
to the world, especially to the West, that ISIS possesses an effective weapon that cannot be
easily extracted. This effective weapon represented by the foreign fighters who already
joined the group, and their supporters who are still in their country and are waiting for the
signal to begin to carry out what to be ordered by their leaders. Even in the second release,
ISIS confirms that even after the fall of the Islamic State, ISIS remains as a global jihadist
organization.
From these two films, which depicted as Hollywood-style productions, we can
understand that the technological capabilities are the most crucial stage for the time
being, and are one of the most significant factors of survival. That indicates to defeat ISIS;
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we need to start from the digital field first; otherwise, the war supported by aircraft and
aerial bombardment will become in vain. Therefore, it is necessary to think that the ISIS
will not only end militarily, but it must also take into account defeat the Islamic State
technologically as well; because its fundamental power lies in this particular aspect.
Therefore, the elimination of it on the ground must accompany by digital victory and
stripped it of the technological capability and expertness alike.
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